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The International Trade Commission 
and Changes to United States Patent 
Law 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal protection of ideas is by no means a novel 
concept. The history of patent law and intellectual property can 
be traced to England’s Statute of Monopolies enacted in 1623. 
And the notion that valuable discoveries should be protected by 
law has been documented as far back as the fourth century BC 
in writings such as Aristotle’s Politics.1 It is debatable as to 
where the proper balancing point lies between allowing 
inventors to adequately profit from their inventions and 
requiring them to share their knowledge with the public. 
Evidence has demonstrated, however, a strong correlation 
between idea protection and innovation.2 The system of patent 
protection in the United States has evolved a great deal since its 
initiation, but a number of principles remain at its core. Among 
these are the promotion of inventiveness,3 the protection of 
property and personhood,4 and the safeguarding of national 
industries.5 It is the last of these goals—the topic of this note—
that was of great concern to our country’s leaders when they 
first created the International Trade Commission (ITC) and 
expanded its powers over international trade and relations.6 
The ITC was created in 1974 to help the United States 
manage its international trade laws, with one of its chief 
  
 1 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND 
POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-5 (4th ed. 2007). 
 2 Id. at 9-10 (citing ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL 
PATENTS: THE NETHERLANDS 1869-1912; SWITZERLAND 1850-1907 (1971)) (providing 
statistical evidence that the reintroduction of a patent system in the Netherlands in 
1912 spurred Dutch inventiveness). 
 3 ALAN L. DURHAM, PATENT LAW ESSENTIALS: A CONCISE GUIDE 2-3 (3d ed. 2009). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Sapna Kumar, The Other Patent Agency: Congressional Regulation of the 
ITC, 61 FLA. L. REV. 529, 547 (2009). 
 6 Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent 
Cases at the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63, 67 (2008). 
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priorities being to promote our country’s competitiveness in the 
global marketplace.7 Despite its recent creation, the ITC’s concern 
for our national industries reflects deep and historic American 
sentiments of nationalism that predate the birth of our nation. A 
multitude of statutes and protocols have been enacted in this vein 
over the course of our country’s existence.8 One of the broadest of 
these initiatives was the 1930 Trade Act, which first introduced 
intellectual-property measures to assist in the protection of the 
U.S. economy, essentially allowing entities to block the 
importation of goods if the effect or threat of such importation 
would injure American industry.9 Section 337 of the Trade Act 
allows parties to address their concerns through administrative 
proceedings, specifically targeting improper importation of goods 
into the United States, and these powers were placed under the 
ITC’s jurisdiction upon its creation.10 Often, complaints brought 
before the ITC against importers take the form of intellectual 
property disputes—namely, claims of patent infringement or 
patent invalidity.11 When Congress granted the ITC jurisdiction to 
address these issues, it effectively created—for the first time in 
U.S. history—a venue other than the federal courts to litigate 
patent disputes.12  
The ITC is much more than just a second venue, 
however, and section 337 proceedings differ greatly from federal-
court proceedings. One major disparity is that the ITC has in 
rem jurisdiction over articles imported into the United States.13 
This power allows for charges to be brought against an alleged 
infringer even if personal jurisdiction is not available.14 
  
 7 About the USITC, U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/press_ 
room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2010) (“The mission of the Commission is to (1) 
administer U.S. trade remedy laws within its mandate in a fair and objective manner; (2) 
provide the President, USTR, and Congress with independent analysis, information, and 
support on matters of tariffs, international trade, and U.S. competitiveness; and (3) 
maintain the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTS).”). 
 8 Chien, supra note 6, at 66. Evidence of this sentiment existed as early as 
the 1770s, with the seizure of underpriced Indian tea during the Boston Tea Party in 
efforts to protect the colonies’ local tea market. Id.  
 9 Id. at 67. 
 10 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2000). 
 11 Kumar, supra note 5, at 544. 
 12 Douglas P. Martin, Preclusive Effect of Factual Determinations of the 
International Trade Commission with Regard to Patent Matters, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 885, 
885-86 (1995). 
 13 Russell E. Levine & James B. Coughlan, United States Intellectual 
Property Litigation and the ITC, IP VALUE (2004), http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/ 
kirkexp/publications/2433/Document1/Levine%20(Globe%20White%20Page).pdf. 
 14 Id. 
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Additionally, in section 337 proceedings an administrative law 
judge—rather than a jury—is the finder of fact, the timeframe 
for litigation and trial is limited, and parties are restricted to 
suing for injunctive relief.15 Due to the multitude of disparities 
between cases brought in the ITC and cases brought in federal 
courts, problems have arisen. Specifically, cases brought before 
the ITC pursuant to section 337 are diverging from the ITC’s 
primary goal of providing protection to American industries.16 
Commentators have also raised concerns that these proceedings 
may violate international law.17 In addition, studies show that 
proceedings before the ITC improperly favor patent holders18 and 
promote inefficiencies in the patent system.19 Furthermore, 
because the federal courts do not give ITC cases preclusive 
effect, judicial resources are wasted.20 
This note argues that this alternate patent-dispute forum 
is wreaking havoc on the U.S. patent system, and suggests a 
possible solution through elimination of ITC patent litigation 
and large-scale amendments to patent law. The following 
sections address the complex issues presented. First, Part II of 
this note provides a short history of patent law in the U.S. 
federal courts. Part III discusses the creation of the ITC and its 
power to hear patent disputes, and offers an in-depth analysis of 
the differences between federal court and ITC proceedings. Next, 
Part IV explores the problems created by ITC patent cases and 
their effect on U.S. patent law. Finally, Part V offers a solution 
to these problems by suggesting the government initiate a 
holistic amendment plan. This plan includes eliminating patent 
practice before the ITC and adopting suggested changes under 
the proposed Patent Pilot Program, creating a more specialized 
district-court system to hear patent cases.21 In addition, the 
  
 15 Id. 
 16 Robert W. Hahn & Hal J. Singer, Assessing Bias in Patent Infringement 
Cases: A Review of International Trade Commission Decisions, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
457, 470 (2008). 
 17 Robert G. Krupka, International Trade Commission Patent Litigation: A 
Unique Experience, in PATENT LITIGATION 1994, at 709, 731 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, 
Trademarks & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Ser. No. G4-3929, 1994). 
 18 Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 490. 
 19 Chien, supra note 6, at 71. 
 20 J. Brian Kopp, Note, In Re Convertible Rowing Exerciser Patent Litigation: 
Should ITC Patent Decisions Be Given Preclusive Effect in District Courts?, 24 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 357, 357 (1991). 
 21 Adam Shartzer, Patent Litigation 101: Empirical Support for the Patent 
Pilot Program’s Solution to Increase Judicial Experience in Patent Law, 18 FED. CIR. 
B.J. 191, 191 (2009). 
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solution recommends that the federal courts adopt some of the 
beneficial aspects of ITC practices, including in rem jurisdiction 
and eased standards by which injunctive relief is awarded. 
II. BACKGROUND OF PATENT LAW IN UNITED STATES 
FEDERAL COURTS 
In the United States, the founding fathers thought that 
intellectual property was important enough to explicitly protect 
it in the Constitution, providing that “Congress shall have 
Power . . . to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”22 
The first U.S. Patent Act was passed in May 1790,23 and the 
first patent was issued within months of its passage.24 Cases 
involving patent issues were treated no differently than other 
federal cases, and could be brought to the district court and 
appealed up through the federal court system. It was not until 
the 1836 revision of the Patent Act that a formal system of 
examination was put into place, setting the stage for the 
current system of patent prosecution and examination that we 
know today.25 Over the next century and a half, the number of 
cases brought before the federal courts grew immensely, and it 
was not until the creation of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in 1982 that the next vital change in U.S. 
patent law was initiated.26 After this change, all federal courts 
were still permitted to hear patent cases, but any appeals 
would now be heard by the newly created Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit.27 Since this time, no other modifications 
have been made to the U.S. federal-court system with respect 
to patent-related cases. The U.S. federal courts were, until very 
recently, the only venue in which to commence patent cases 
  
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 23 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 109-112 (1790) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (2006)). 
 24 The first patent was issued to Samuel Hopkins of Philadelphia on July 31, 1790, 
for the process of making potash from wood ashes. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 8. 
 25 Id. In the world of patents, the term “prosecution” refers to the application 
process through which patents are obtained. Id. at 50. 
 26 Id. at 11. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was created in 
response to divergent trends being set by various circuits throughout the United 
States. Id. By creating a single, unified court of appeals that would handle all appeals 
involving patent matters, differences in the law could be unified, and alterations to the 
patent doctrine could be established as believed necessary. Id. 
 27 Id. 
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and still remain the most prominent arena for the protection of 
patents.28  
III. ITC JURISDICTION—AN ALTERNATE VENUE IS CREATED 
The formation of the ITC and subsequent congressional 
changes to its function have created a unique and appealing 
alternate forum for patent litigation. The numerous procedural 
distinctions between cases held before the ITC and those before 
federal courts provide for a different, and often preferred, 
environment for rights holders, leading to an increase in its 
popularity in recent years.29 
A. History of the ITC 
The ITC was created by Congress as part of the Trade 
Act of 1974.30 One of the ITC’s purposes is to provide remedies 
for unfair trade practices, and in order to ensure its 
effectiveness, Congress granted it expansive jurisdiction and 
remedial powers.31 Consequently, the ITC became an alternate 
and appealing venue for intellectual property cases, in which 
domestic producers may assert their rights to exclude 
infringing products from importation into the United States.32 
The ITC is responsible for administering a statute called 
Unfair Practices in Import Trade,33 commonly referred to as 
“section 337.”34 Section 337 was originally created with the 
Tariff Act of 1930 but was largely ignored for decades after its 
passage.35 The ability to effectively exclude infringing products 
was hindered by its requirement that the President be involved 
in the process, making it both very cumbersome and 
  
 28 Id. 
 29 Bryan A. Schwartz, Where the Patent Trials Are: How the U.S. 
International Trade Commission Hit the Big Time as a Patent Litigation Forum, 20 
INTELL. PROP. L. NEWSL. 1, 1 (2002). 
 30 Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975). 
 31 Martin, supra note 12, at 885. This power included the ability to 
investigate unfair practices in import trade through all legal and equitable defenses 
brought before it. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (1988). 
 32 Martin, supra note 12, at 885. 
 33 19 U.S.C. § 1337. 
 34 Gilbert B. Kaplan & Courtland Reichman, The ITC or the District Court?—
Where to Protect Your International Intellectual Property, BRIEFLY, Nov. 2006, at v. 
 35 Krupka, supra note 17, at 709. 
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inefficient.36 However, Congress remedied this issue by creating 
of the ITC, which transferred exclusion power from the 
President to the commission in 1974.37  
After its creation, section 337 proceedings have been 
used to halt the importation of goods that infringe U.S. patents 
at an ever-increasing pace.38 In 1988, section 337 was further 
amended to increase its effectiveness and availability of use 
through the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act.39 These 
amendments effectively eased the burden of establishing a 
patent-infringement violation by dropping several 
requirements for patent holders filing complaints.40 These 
changes made it cheaper to litigate patent cases before the ITC 
and expanded patent holders’ access to the forum. As a result, 
the number of patent cases that were brought before the ITC 
began to increase.41 The number of cases has climbed from only 
nine complaints filed in 1999 to forty complaints in 2008, 
representing an increase of over 400% in only ten years.42 This 
increase in patent-related cases before the ITC is beginning to 
have drastic effects on patent law within the United States, 
and the rise in popularity of the venue has shown little, if any, 
sign of waning.  
  
 36 Id. at 710. The Tariff Commission was empowered to investigate unfair-
competition complaints and make recommendations to the President, who had statutory 
authority to increase tariffs or ban products from importation altogether. Id. 
 37 Id. In addition to the transfer of powers to the ITC, other amendments 
were also passed that made the use of section 337 a viable alternative to federal court 
cases. These amendments (1) included the provision for faster relief by imposing a 
twelve- to- eighteen-month limit on decisions (this requirement was later revoked 
through amendments made in 1994), (2) increased the reliability of proceedings by 
creating formal-adjudication provisions, and (3) made available patent-invalidity and 
unenforceability defenses. Donna M. Tanquay & Audrey M. Sugimura, Patent 
Litigation Before the ITC, in PATENT LITIGATION, supra note 17, at 747, 754. 
 38 Schwartz, supra note 29, at 1. 
 39 See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, § 1, 19 U.S.C. § 2901 
(1988). 
 40 Kumar, supra note 5, at 548-49. Prior to the amendments, the Act required 
that a patent holder engage in a domestic industry, that the industry was “efficiently 
and economically operated,” and that the importation of the goods would substantially 
injure the industry. 19 U.S.C. § 337(a) (1987). The 1988 Act eliminated the second and 
third requirements for intellectual-property-infringement cases. Kumar, supra note 5, 
at 549.  
 41 Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 34, at v. 
 42 All section 337 cases before the ITC are available online at http://www. 
usitc.gov. 
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B. Distinctions Between Federal Courts and the ITC 
The most obvious distinction between decisions 
rendered by the ITC and those by U.S. federal courts is that 
the ITC is an independent federal agency.43 It is not tied to the 
judicial or legislative branches, or to any other department of 
the executive branch.44 It is presided over by six commissioners 
appointed by the President who each serve nine-year terms.45 In 
addition to this evident distinction, further significant 
substantive and procedural differences exist in almost every 
aspect of a proceeding before the ITC when compared to 
federal-court cases.46 
1. Required Showing of Domestic Industry 
One important difference in ITC hearings is the 
requirement to show that a domestic industry exists.47 
Specifically, the ITC requires that an industry relating to the 
product protected by patent exists or is in the process of being 
established in the United States, in addition to the elements 
necessary to establish a claim of patent infringement.48 At one 
time, the domestic-industry requirement served as a significant 
hurdle that plaintiffs had to clear before filing a patent 
infringement suit before the ITC,49 barring suit unless the 
importation of the goods would destroy, substantially injure, or 
prevent the establishment of an industry.50 Now, however, the 
requisite standard has been lowered, requiring only that there 
be significant investment in a plant and equipment, significant 
  
 43 Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 34, at 6. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 The number of procedural and substantive differences between ITC and 
district court proceedings is enormous. Discussion on all of these differences would 
exceed the scope of this note, so only those differences that are relevant to the 
discussion are addressed. For a complete discussion of all differences, see generally id. 
 47 John Gladstone Mills III et al., Importation and Exportation of Patented 
Goods, in 4 PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 21:43 (2d ed. 2009). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. The current requirement as defined under the Tariff Act of 1930 is far 
less burdensome than the previous statute. Prior to the amendment, the effect or 
tendency of the importation of the goods into the United States had to “destroy or 
substantially injure an industry efficiently and economically operated in the United 
States,” or “prevent the establishment of such an industry.” Id. This requirement was 
eliminated to do away with the need to present and evaluate extensive economic data. 
Id. 
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employment of labor or capital, or substantial investment in 
the industry’s exploitation.51 With this change, the domestic-
industry requirement is far less of an impediment for potential 
plaintiffs.52  
2. Abbreviated Case Duration 
Another significant distinction between proceedings 
before the ITC and federal courts is the estimated timeline of 
the case.53 At one time, fixed time periods were set for 
investigations, allowing both parties to know exactly how long 
the case would last, but this requirement was lifted in the 1994 
amendments.54 Efficiency is still an important focus of the ITC, 
however, and thus a provision was adopted that required cases 
be completed “at the earliest practicable time.”55 A survey of 
section 337 cases before the ITC between 1999 and 2004 
indicated that the average case took approximately thirteen 
and a half months.56 This is significantly shorter than the three 
to five years a typical patent-infringement case takes when 
brought in the federal courts.57 This drastic difference in length 
of cases offers huge incentives to plaintiffs both in time and in 
estimated expenses, and serves as one of the biggest draws to 
ITC proceedings.  
3. In Rem Jurisdiction 
A major difference between ITC proceedings and 
federal-court proceedings is that only the ITC has in rem 
jurisdiction over articles imported into the United States.58 
Consequently, complainants can bring charges against an 
alleged infringer even if personal jurisdiction over the 
respondent is not present—an option that is unavailable in 
federal court.59 In ITC proceedings, the complainant does not 
have to prove that the respondent has a domestic presence or 
  
 51 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(2) (2006). 
 52 See Mills et al., supra note 47, at 21-177; see also infra Part IV.A. 
 53 Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 34, at 18. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. To achieve this goal, the commission sets a “target date” by which the 
case should be completed, typically twelve to fifteen months. Id. 
 56 Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Levine & Coughlan, supra note 13. 
 59 Id. 
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bring suit against the purchasers who are established in the 
United States, giving the commission very broad reach.60 In 
addition, the ITC provides the opportunity to address 
infringement by multiple products and multiple parties in a 
single forum.61 In federal-court patent trials, time and expenses 
are exhausted litigating jurisdiction and service issues, 
especially if overseas companies are involved.62 By giving the 
ITC such broad jurisdiction these costs and headaches are 
almost entirely eliminated.  
4. Employment of Administrative Law Judges and 
Better Courtroom Resources 
Another considerable difference in proceedings before 
the ITC is that an administrative law judge (ALJ) serves as the 
finder of fact.63 There is no jury involved and it is up to the ALJ 
to both oversee the case and to determine whether section 337 
has been violated.64 Once the ALJ makes an initial 
determination, the decision may be submitted to the 
commission for review.65 This initial determination will become 
final unless the commission orders that further review is 
required, or a petition is filed by one of the parties involved.66 
The decision is then submitted to the President of the United 
States for review.67 The President is given a sixty-day period 
during which he can disapprove of the commission’s 
determination for “policy reasons.”68 “Under these 
circumstances, the determination by the commission will have 
no force or effect,” but “disapprovals are rare” and have only 
been applied in “limited circumstances.”69 
The use of an ALJ, who is often experienced in 
overseeing intellectual-property disputes involving complex 
technical issues,70 is one of the reasons some complainants 
  
 60 Id. 
 61 Schwartz, supra note 29, at 2. 
 62 Id. 
 63 See Kaplan & Reichman, supra note 34, at 24-25. 
 64 Id. at 25. 
 65 Id. at 26. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 28. In practice, “policy reasons” have included national security, 
national economic interests, and potential impact on U.S. foreign relations. Id. 
 69 Id. at 29. 
 70 Schwartz, supra note 29, at 6.  
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believe that the ITC is a preferable forum. The theory is that 
because the ALJs and their clerks hear no other type of cases, 
they become well versed and quite adept at dealing with the 
intricacies of patent cases.71 Also, the ITC’s Office of Unfair 
Import Investigations (OUII), which represents the public’s 
interest during the investigations, is comprised primarily of 
career attorneys.72 Due to the absence of all other types of cases, 
the ALJs and OUII can maintain a singular focus in their 
responsibilities, arguably resulting in better decisions.73 In 
addition, the ITC is equipped with high-tech capabilities in all 
of its courtrooms, and most parties and judges will typically 
avail themselves of real-time reporting and sophisticated 
graphic presentations.74 In many patent trials, the subject 
matter is very technical, making these facilities quite useful 
and accommodating. This experience and tenure working with 
patent cases would be hard to find in any federal court and 
again invites an increasing number of litigants to the ITC. 
5. Available Remedies 
Finally, the available remedies offered by the ITC are 
also unique. In section 337 proceedings, unlike in federal-court 
proceedings, monetary damages are unavailable.75 Preliminary 
injunctions are permitted but are rarely necessary due to the 
speed of the litigation process.76 Alternatively, the commission 
generally enters exclusion orders, either in limited fashion 
against a named respondent or against all infringing articles 
without regard to source.77 The scope of ITC relief is narrower 
because it only focuses on the control of the importation of goods 
into the United States, but this focus is balanced by the 
injunctive powers it can grant, which far exceed those available 
in district courts. The ability, through “general” exclusion 
orders, to exclude all imported products of a certain type—
regardless of whether the manufacturer was a defendant in the 
case—is unparalleled in the courts and hugely enticing to 
  
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Section 337 Investigations: Answers to Frequently Asked Questions, USITC 
PUB. 4105, at 24 (Mar. 2009), [hereinafter USITC FAQ], http://www.usitc.gov/intellectual_ 
property/documents/337_faqs.pdf. 
 76 Kumar, supra note 5, at 538. 
 77 USITC FAQ, supra note 75, at 24.  
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potential plaintiffs.78 Exclusion orders offer a much more efficient 
mechanism for dealing with the importation of infringing 
products by stopping goods at the border rather than suing once 
the goods enter the marketplace.79 In addition, “the so-called 
limited exclusion orders” against named defendants “are not so 
limited.”80 These “orders . . . apply prospectively against all of [a 
defendant’s] existing or future products of the [same] type,” not 
just the models presented at trial.81 
Not only is the injunctive relief provided by the ITC 
broader than in federal court, but it is also much easier to 
obtain.82 In eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., the Supreme 
Court held that in order to obtain injunctive relief in the 
federal courts, a patent holder must pass a four-part analysis.83 
Accordingly, a party seeking an injunction in federal court 
must demonstrate (1) that it has suffered irreparable injury, (2) 
that monetary damages are inadequate to compensate for the 
injury, (3) that a remedy in equity is warranted when 
considering the balance of hardships to the plaintiff and 
defendant, and (4) that the public interest would not be 
disserved by the injunction.84 The ITC’s standard for injunctive 
relief is much lower. The ITC typically issues injunctions 
whenever it finds that a product infringes on a claimant’s 
patent.85 Notably, before issuing an exclusion order, the ITC 
must consider the effect the exclusion order will have on the 
“public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the 
United States economy, the production of like or directly 
competitive articles in the United States, and United States 
consumers.”86 However, these policy concerns are typically 
downplayed and rarely stop orders of exclusion.87 
When considering the differences between ITC and 
district-court proceedings, it is understandable why some 
plaintiffs would choose to bring suit against alleged patent 
infringers before the ITC rather than in district courts. Combine 
all of the potential benefits with a higher success rate for 
  
 78 Schwartz, supra note 29, at 5. 
 79 Kumar, supra note 5, at 565-66. 
 80 Schwartz, supra note 29, at 6. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Kumar, supra note 5, at 566. 
 83 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006). 
 84 Id. 
 85 Kumar, supra note 5, at 566. 
 86 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d)(1) (2000). 
 87 Kumar, supra note 5, at 566. 
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patentees than in district court, and the reason for the ITC’s 
blossoming popularity is clear.88 Patent attorneys and strategists 
have made practice before the ITC a very relevant alternative to 
bringing suit before a U.S. federal court, and increasing 
numbers of experienced attorneys will recommend ITC hearings 
over the courts in a variety of situations.89 But just because this 
venue is popular does not mean that it is proper, and many of 
these differences have had serious and detrimental effects on 
patent practice in the United States. 
IV. PROBLEMS CAUSED BY ITC PATENT CASES 
With all of the procedural and substantive divergences 
of patent law before the ITC, it is easy to understand how the 
application of patent law deviates from the federal court’s 
precedent. With the increased popularity of practice before the 
ITC in recent years, criticism of this alternative venue has also 
risen sharply and for just cause.90 Patent practice utilizing 
section 337 in cases before the ITC is beginning to have 
harmful effects on the state of patent law within the United 
States, and the time has come to initiate much needed change 
before its effects worsen. In this section, I first address the 
concern that practice before the ITC is deviating from section 
337’s intended purpose. Second, I discuss whether ITC 
practices are violating international law. Third, I explore the 
accusations that the ITC improperly favors patent holders. 
Finally, I address the possibilities of forum shopping, 
conflicting decisions, and judicial waste.  
  
 88 A snapshot of cases between 1995 and 2000 shows nearly a seventy-
percent success rate for the patentee (if settlement numbers are included). Schwartz, 
supra note 29, at 7-8. 
 89 Mark Abate and Charles Sanders of Goodwin Procter LLP have theorized 
that the ITC should especially be considered in five specific scenarios: (1) when the 
patent owner files suit early in the patent’s product cycle, (2) where personal 
jurisdiction is questionable, (3) in response to a declaratory judgment or a patent-
infringement action, (4) where the patent claims a method of manufacture, and (5) 
when the litigation target makes only a “sale for importation.” Mark J. Abate & 
Charles Sanders, Patent Litigation in the ITC, 9 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 3 (2009). 
 90 See, e.g., Chien, supra note 6; Hahn & Singer, supra note 16; Kumar, supra 
note 5. 
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A. ITC Cases Brought Under Section 337 Are Deviating 
from the Statute’s Intended Purpose 
When the ITC was created in 1974, Congress intended it 
to protect domestic industry.91 Previously, the agency served only 
as an advisor to the President, but with its expanded powers, it 
now has the authority to make final decisions regarding unfair 
trade practices and to issue exclusion orders.92 Upon granting the 
ITC these powers, intellectual-property claims brought against 
foreign companies began to be filed.93 By the early 1980s, 
however, advocates motivated by an increased need for 
protection of domestic industry were building momentum to 
make amendments to the 1974 Trade Act.94 Congress found that 
unfair trade practices were “cumbersome and costly,” and that 
existing laws did not provide U.S. patent holders with adequate 
protection against foreign companies.95 Thus, Congress passed 
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, which 
expanded the scope of section 337 to make patent-infringement 
claims against foreign companies easier by lowering the 
requirements for bringing suit.96 With Congress recognizing the 
importance of protecting our national industries, it is easy to 
understand why they granted such broad powers to the ITC. 
However, Congress failed to specify a necessary limit to the 
scope of these powers, which has allowed claimants to file a 
broad range of actions pursuant to section 337 that deviate from 
the ITC’s fundamental goals. 
The ITC forum is not limited to particular parties 
dependent upon nationality, and complaints are no longer 
confined to cases that protect domestic industries from unfair 
competitors, even though this was the purpose behind the 
commission’s creation.97 The only jurisdictional prerequisites are 
that the defendant import goods and that the complainant 
satisfy the domestic-industry requirement of section 337(a)(2).98 
To be a domestic industry, a company need only show that it has 
  
 91 Kumar, supra note 5, at 544. The ITC was created through the Trade Act 
of 1974. Id.  
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. at 546. 
 94 Id. at 545. 
 95 Id. (quoting the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107). 
 96 Id. at 548-49. 
 97 Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 469. 
 98 Id. 
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a “significant investment in plant and equipment; significant 
employment of labor or capital, or substantial investment in its 
exploitation, including engineering, research and development, 
or licensing” in the United States.99 Also, since there is no bar 
against bringing suit against industries or companies based in 
the United States, many of the cases brought before the ITC are 
actually against domestic manufacturers or suppliers.100 In fact, 
many cases involve only foreign companies or are cases brought 
by foreign companies against domestic companies.101 As long as 
any component or article is imported into the United States, the 
ITC will hear the case. These scenarios are a far cry from the 
ITC’s initial motives to ensure the protection of U.S. industry, 
and this trend is not fading. Cases involving domestic 
complainants against a foreign respondent have steadily 
declined since the ITC was formed.102 In the 1980s, domestic-
versus-foreign cases accounted for 83% of all section 337 patent 
cases; in the 1990s, these cases accounted for 74% of all cases; 
and from 2000 to 2006, they accounted for 66% of all cases.103 
This movement away from domestic-versus-foreign cases 
suggests that the ITC is deviating from its original goal of 
protecting U.S. industry from foreign competitors. Steps need to 
be taken to amend this state of affairs. 
B. Potential Violations of International Law 
The motivation behind the ITC’s abandoning of its 
protectionist roots lies primarily in the development of 
international law and the United States’ need to look beyond 
our borders when making decisions regarding our nation’s 
industries. As the interdependence of the world’s nations grew, 
and treaties were signed and agreements were made, the 
single-sided and now-antiquated concern with national 
interests fell by the wayside. The original purpose of section 
337—to give advantages to national industry at the expense of 
foreign competition—is not only frowned upon in today’s 
  
 99 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a)(3) (2000). 
 100 Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 469. See, e.g., In re Certain Baseband Processor 
Chips & Chipsets (Broadcom v. Qualcomm), Inv. No. 337-TA-543 (June 21, 2005). 
 101 Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 469. Four cases in 2001 were brought by a 
foreign company against another foreign company. See, e.g., In re Certain Portable Digital 
Media Players, Inv. No. 337-TA-573, (June 14, 2006); In re Certain Video Cassette Devices, 
Inv. No. 337-TA-464, (Sept. 14, 2001); see also Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 470. 
 102 Hahn & Singer, supra note 16, at 470. 
 103 Id. 
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globalized world, but these actions also violate international 
protocols.104 In 1988, a General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) panel ruled that some aspects of section 337 violated 
international law.105 Specifically, the report alleged that foreign 
respondents were being discriminated against due to the strict 
time limits that were believed to benefit local residents, the 
inability of foreign respondents to assert counterclaims, the 
potential for dual path litigation, the complainant’s choice of 
forum options, and the use of broad general exclusion orders.106 
To address these concerns, Congress amended section 
337 in 1995 in a number of ways.107 The amendments removed 
the strict statutory time limit of twelve or eighteen months, 
allowing adequate preparation time for foreign companies.108 
Congress also heightened the requirements for awarding 
general exclusion orders to limit the ease of award.109 Finally, 
the amendments permitted defendants to file counterclaims to 
even the playing field.110 Although these changes are seemingly 
justified, they were the initial steps leading to the current state 
of controversial patent-law practices in the ITC. It was the 
congressional attempt to bring a purposefully prejudicial 
statutory effort in line with international obligations that has 
led to the middle-ground, compromised solution we now have in 
place. Assuming the amendments made to the statute were 
effective, there are in essence two possible outcomes: (1) an 
effective but now illegal protection of domestic companies at 
the expense of foreign competitors as originally proscribed by 
section 337, or (2) an ineffective and much-diluted effort that is 
legal but in no way provides U.S. companies with the 
protection section 337 was created to offer. The current state of 
the law leaves us squarely in the latter of these options and is 
strong evidence of the need for change. 
  
 104 Joel W. Rogers & Joseph P. Whitlock, Is Section 337 Consistent with the 
GATT and the TRIPS Agreement?, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 459, 475-77 (2002). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 476. 
 107 Ralph A. Mittelberger & Gary M. Hnath, Changes in Section 337 as a 
Result of the GATT-Implementing Legislation, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 465, 479 (1994).  
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. at 486. 
 110 Id. at 480-81. But these counterclaims are automatically removed to a U.S. 
district court. Id.  
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C. ITC Practice Improperly Favors Patent Holders 
Critics have raised and debated a further issue with 
current patent practice before the ITC—here, in relation to the 
results of the proceeding. For years, critics have argued that 
the ITC forum improperly favors patent holders, but little 
empirical evidence was offered in support of these claims. In 
2008, however, Robert Hahn and Hal Singer published the 
results of a study they performed, finally offering firm 
statistical support to these claims.111  
One of the metrics Hahn and Singer focused on was 
relative percentages of cases finding patent infringement in the 
ITC versus federal district courts.112 After comparing patent 
cases brought in both venues between 1972 and September 
2006, a huge disparity in the outcomes became obvious. The 
overall rate at which the ITC found infringement was 23%, 
while infringement was only found in about 6% before district 
courts.113 Hahn and Singer have speculated that this drastic 
difference might be due to the fact that patent cases before the 
district court often do not go to trial or that the ITC may hear 
stronger patent cases than the district courts.114 Regardless of 
potential reasoning, the relative success rates at the ITC are 
shocking, and these statistics fully support the alleged bias for 
patent holders in ITC cases.115  
This vast discrepancy adds to the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of patent law within the United States. If a 
patent holder has four times the chance of succeeding before 
the ITC, the traditional (and arguably sole) proper venue in 
which to bring a patent infringement case—the federal district 
courts—becomes far less appealing. This likelihood of success is 
one of the many factors contributing to the rise in ITC 
popularity, which is creating an increasingly large sector of 
patent law that is being decided on an entirely different set of 
standards and procedures.  
  
 111 Hahn & Singer, supra note 16. 
 112 Id. at 473. 
 113 Id. at 475. 
 114 Id. at 476. 
 115 Id. The Hahn and Singer study then explored the rates at which each 
venue awards injunctive relief, finding that the ITC is again biased in favor of the 
patent holders due to the heightened standard in district courts set forth in eBay, Inc. 
v. MercExchange, Inc. Id. (examining eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 
(2006)). For further discussion, see infra Part V.B.3.  
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D. Forum Shopping and Dual Litigation Lead to 
Inefficiencies and the Potential for Conflicting Decisions 
In addition to progressing away from protecting 
domestic industry, trends also indicate that the ITC is being 
treated as an alternate, and sometimes even simultaneous, 
venue in which to try patent-infringement cases.116 The lack of 
consistency between the proceedings and remedies allows 
litigants to shop their claims, selecting the better of the two 
venues in which to bring their complaints.117 This creation of 
inconsistent patent law and the ability to take advantage of the 
system was exactly what Congress was trying to prevent when 
it created the consolidated and focused Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit in 1982.118 The increase in ITC patent cases is 
therefore acting to reverse the congressional goal of promoting 
predictable and consistent patent law within the United States. 
Additionally, the ITC is not only being taken advantage of as 
an alternate venue through forum shopping, but also as a 
parallel venue in which to bring suit concurrent to a federal 
court case.119 In a study conducted by Coleen Chien, 65% of 
patent cases tried before the ITC between 1995 and mid-2007 
had district-court counterparts.120 This absence of coordination 
between the ITC and the U.S. court systems has many negative 
effects. In addition to the ability to forum shop, the allowance 
of parallel cases increases this harm by exposing litigants to 
the risk of duplicative litigation and potentially conflicting 
outcomes.121 
E. Preclusivity Not Given to ITC Decisions Results in 
Judicial Waste 
The problem of judicial waste and conflicting decisions 
promoted by ITC practice is magnified by the fact that the 
federal courts do not give preclusive effect to ITC 
determinations. For example, the Delaware District Court’s 
1989 opinion in In re Convertible Rowing Exerciser held that 
the ITC’s decision that a patent was invalid should not 
  
 116 Chien, supra note 6, at 71. Simultaneous suits can be brought alleging the 
same claims in both federal court and before the ITC. Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 1, at 11. 
 119 Chien, supra note 6, at 92. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. at 71. 
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preclude the district court from considering the patent’s 
validity de novo.122 As later stated, “[the] district court can 
attribute whatever persuasive value to the prior ITC decisions 
that it considers justified.”123 This practice allows a party that 
loses before the ITC based on patent invalidity to have a second 
chance to succeed before a district court. The effect is to allow a 
complainant to test the validity of his patent in the ITC forum 
prior to bringing suit in the district courts, encouraging costly 
and duplicative litigation.124 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Due to all the potential issues surrounding patent cases 
and the ITC, section 337 proceedings have created quite a 
controversy. In order to right the path of patent law in the 
United States, the only viable option is to abolish section 337 
patent practice before the ITC. For the majority of this 
country’s history, the federal courts have been the sole venue in 
which patent cases can be tried, and this norm should be 
reestablished. There is something to be learned, however, from 
the ITC, and now is an ideal time to evaluate some of the 
advantages ITC practice has demonstrated with the multitude 
of proposals currently before Congress relating to patent law in 
the United States. One such proposal is the Patent Pilot 
Program—an amendment that would allow for more 
specialization in the federal courts regarding patent cases.125 
Much like the benefits that specialization offers the ITC, 
numerous advantages in the federal courts can be realized. 
This program should be initiated as a proper base upon which 
additional modifications can be made. These further 
amendments include the adoption of in rem jurisdiction for 
cases relating to the importation of goods, as well as a per se 
right to injunctive relief, attributes found to be quite beneficial 
in the ITC forum. 
  
 122 721 F. Supp. 596 (D. Del. 1989), appeal denied, 904 F.2d 44 (Fed. Cir. 
1990), reh’g denied, 903 F.2d 822 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
 123 Tex. Instruments v. Cypress Semiconductor, 90 F.3d 1558, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 124 Kopp, supra note 20, at 357. 
 125 Shartzer, supra note 21, at 192. 
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A. Proposed Amendments Before Congress 
Numerous proposals have been introduced to Congress 
that have the potential to alter U.S. patent law in drastic ways. 
These proposals include the Patent Pilot Program,126 as well as 
the Patent Reform Act of 2010,127 both of which include 
proposals that affect the heart of U.S. patent law but do not 
directly address the ITC debate. Specifically, the Patent Pilot 
Program proposes to direct patent cases to judges that choose 
to hear them more often.128 This would be done by segregating 
quasi-specialized patent trial judges from the general pool of 
judges.129 District courts that participate in the Patent Pilot 
Program would hear all the patent cases brought in their 
district, creating in essence specialized patent trial courts.130 
The ultimate goal was to create a more experienced and 
specialized judicial presence before which patent cases can be 
brought.131 For many of the same reasons that the Federal 
Circuit Court of Appeals was created as the sole jurisdiction to 
bring appeals of patent cases, this specialization was proposed 
to help make decisions in patent law cases more predictable, 
more efficient, and most importantly, more accurate.132 The 
theory is that the more patent cases a judge receives, the more 
likely the judge will correctly decide the case and the more 
efficient the entire process will become.133  
The Patent Reform Act, in comparison to the Patent 
Pilot Program, is a much more unwieldy and controversial 
animal. This Act has been introduced in both the House and 
Senate, and many of the elements mirror the proposed Patent 
Reform legislation from years prior.134 Some of the more 
consequential changes proposed include (1) a first-to-file 
system, which gives priority of invention to the first to file an 
application, rather than the applicant who first invented it; (2) 
  
 126 Id. 
 127 Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act of 2010, PANTENTLYO L. BLOG (Mar. 8, 2010), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reform-act-of-2010-an-overview.html. 
 128 Shartzer, supra note 21, at 192. The program was introduced by 
Representative Darrell Issa under House Bill 34 in 2007. Id. 
 129 David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim 
Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the 
International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1701 (2009). 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Shartzer, supra note 21, at 192. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Crouch, supra note 127. 
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a change in the calculation of damages based on the invention’s 
“specific contribution over the prior art”; (3) expanded 
reexamination proceedings that can be initiated based on 
published prior art or public use or sale in the United States 
rather than just patents; (4) limiting the venues in which to 
bring patent cases in attempts to limit bringing cases in 
jurisdictions that favor patent holders, or cause undue 
hardship for the defendants; and finally, (5) the abolishment of 
interference practices.135 Some of the more controversial 
sections were removed in comparison to the 2005 and 2007 
Patent Reform Acts,136 but the list of proposed changes is still 
quite impressive. 
Although many of the proposals laid out in the Patent 
Reform Act are of questionable value to the U.S. patent system, 
the effects these changes may have are still very much 
unknown.137 The Act’s scope is immense, and unlike the 
proposals of the Patent Pilot Program, the issues at hand are 
very deeply tied to international law and the United States’ 
obligation to honor various treaties and agreements with 
foreign nations.138 There is continued debate before Congress 
whether all, some, or none of these changes should be 
implemented, and these debates will likely continue at length 
as they have for many years.  
B. Suggested Approach 
With all of the changes to patent law initiated by practice 
before the ITC, and with the current amendments on the table 
before Congress in the form of the Patent Reform Act and Patent 
  
 135 Id. 
 136 Mark P. Walters, Patent Reform 2009: It’s a “Threepeat,” WASH. STATE 
PATENT L. BLOG (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.wapatents.com/2009/03/patent-reform-2009 
-its-threepeat.html. Some of the sections removed in the 2009 and 2010 proposals 
include a requirement for quality submissions that mandates (1) an applicant research 
whether a patent exists prior to filing, (2) an elimination of the equitable conduct 
requirement, and (3) the granting of rule-making authority to the USPTO. Id. 
 137 Arguments have been made both in favor and against each of the 
alterations outlined in the Patent Reform Act. See, e.g., Kelly C. McKinney, The Patent 
Reform Act of 2007 and International Patent Law Harmonization, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 
125 (2008). However, the discussion of these potential amendments and their effects is 
beyond the scope of this note. 
 138 For example, the TRIPS Agreement, to which the United States is a 
signatory, provides support for many of the Act’s amendments, and in general, many of 
the other nations, who are also members of GATT and the WIPO, have more consistent 
practices when it comes to patent laws in general (i.e., almost all have first to file 
rather than first to invent systems). McKinney, supra note 137, at 132-43. 
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Pilot Program, the direction of patent law in the United States 
has become quite uncertain. Changes are needed to increase the 
quality and efficiency of our system, and in order to jumpstart 
these efforts, an intermediate and manageable solution needs to 
be initiated. This note proposes that Congress adopt the Patent 
Pilot Program’s specialized grouping of patent trial courts as a 
harmonized and consolidated base, upon which needed 
amendments to the patent system within the United States can 
more easily be enacted. Along with this implementation, 
immediate amendments also need to be adopted. Specifically, 
some aspects of section 337 proceedings before the ITC must be 
transferred to these specialized district patent courts, and to the 
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals. First, in order to protect one of 
the only beneficial roles that the ITC does play, in rem 
jurisdiction should be granted to these courts in cases involving 
importation of allegedly infringing products. Second, the 
injunctive powers of the ITC must also be transferred, in some 
respects, to the federal courts through a congressional action to 
amend the Patent Act to allow for a per se right to injunction. 
1. Implement the Patent Pilot Program 
Since the creation of the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals in 1982, there has been much debate over whether the 
goals of this endeavor have been met. With decisional 
uniformity and the reduction of forum shopping as primary 
objectives, most commentators agree that the Federal Circuit 
has been a resounding success.139 The proposal for the Patent 
Pilot Program was submitted in light of the Federal Circuit’s 
success. Adoption of this proposal is the first key step toward 
the harmonization of patent law in the United States.  
The theory that having more experienced judges will 
lead to efficiency, clarity, and uniformity seems obvious. Critics 
are still not entirely persuaded, however, that the Patent Pilot 
Program is an endeavor worth initiating.140 To combat this 
uncertainty, Adam Shartzer performed an empirical study in 
2009 in an attempt to predict the likely success of the 
  
 139 Shartzer, supra note 21, at 191; see also Richard Linn, The Future of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Now That It Has Turned 21, 53 AM. 
U. L. REV. 731, 732, 737 (2004) (noting that the Federal Circuit quickly achieved 
uniformity in patent law and that “the future in the patent area will be no different than 
in the past in striving to bring uniformity, certainty, and clarity to the patent laws”). 
 140 For arguments against the Patent Pilot Program, see Schwartz, supra note 
129, at 1701-02. 
1114 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:3 
program.141 His findings showed a direct correlation between 
judges’ experience with patent cases and their affirmance rates 
at the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals.142 This data strongly 
supports the likelihood of the Patent Pilot Program’s success 
and lends further support for its adoption.143 
In addition to its likelihood of success in promoting better 
decisions, one of the most important effects will be its ability to 
consolidate the realm in which patent law is practiced. By 
limiting the number of district courts in which patent cases are 
commenced, amendments to patent law can be made more easily 
and will be implemented more consistently. In addition, much 
like the current ITC,144 these courts could be adapted to offer 
high-tech facilities with features such as multimedia that 
supports real-time reporting and graphic presentations. 
2. Adopt In Rem Jurisdiction for Cases Relating to the 
Importation of Allegedly Infringing Goods 
One of the principal benefits of litigating patent cases 
before the ITC is its broad in rem jurisdiction.145 Without the 
requirement of establishing personal jurisdiction over the 
alleged infringing party, suits could be brought earlier in the 
process—specifically, before the alleged infringing product is 
sold or offered for sale within the United States.146 Jurisdiction 
is derived from the imported articles, not the presence of the 
parties or unfair acts in the vicinity of the forum.147 The benefits 
in rem jurisdiction offer are massive, and this solution should 
be implemented in the federal courts when dealing with patent 
cases relating to importation. 
In addition, in rem jurisdiction offers the opportunity to 
address infringement by multiple products and by multiple 
  
 141 Shartzer, supra note 21, at 193. 
 142 Id. at 231-33. 
 143 Shartzer’s study was based on comparing patent-case outcomes from the 
top fifteen patent districts in terms of patent-case filings, and compares the number of 
times a judge has been affirmed by the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals in relation to 
the number of times that particular judge had his cases reviewed by the Federal 
Circuit. A total of 616 cases were analyzed, and a direct correlation was found, 
indicating that affirmance rates improve as district judges have more of their cases 
appealed and reviewed by the Federal Circuit. See id. at 226-27. 
 144 Schwartz, supra note 29, at 6. 
 145 Id. at 3-4. 
 146 See id. at 4. 
 147 Id. 
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parties in a single forum.148 One of the biggest drawbacks to 
patent cases in federal court, and one of the main reasons that 
the ITC has become so popular, is the difficulty arising from 
jurisdiction and service issues.149 Fighting over these issues, 
especially when a multinational or foreign company is involved, 
requires exorbitant amounts of time and money to resolve.150 
With the adoption of in rem jurisdiction, these problems all but 
disappear. 
The international community’s concern regarding the 
current ITC practices seems likely to pertain to this in rem 
jurisdiction right if granted to the federal courts. This concern, 
however, is unfounded. The “national treatment” commitment 
to treat all parties alike will be maintained if this jurisdictional 
right is granted properly, and many of the major concerns the 
international community had with patent practice before the 
ITC would be eliminated. For example, foreign respondents 
would no longer face dual litigation in the ITC and federal 
courts, discriminatory time limits that favor local residents, or 
broad forum-selection rules that favor complainants.151 With the 
exception of the liberal general exclusion orders (discussed 
below with the proposed standard for injunctive relief), all the 
concerns of the international community will no longer be at 
issue. With the abolition of the ITC and the adoption of the 
Patent Pilot Program, the concerns of forum shopping and dual 
litigation cease to exist.  
3. Adopt a Per Se Right to Injunctive Relief in Federal 
Court Patent Cases 
The availability of injunctive relief is one of the major 
values highlighted by ITC patent practice. This remedy is one 
of the major reasons that practice in this forum has become so 
popular in recent years, especially in light of the heightened 
bar set in the federal courts by the eBay decision.152 The 
question raised is whether the lowered standards available at 
the ITC would offer benefits to the traditional U.S. patent 
system. It is important to note that just because something is 
popular or preferred does not make it more likely to be 
  
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Krupka, supra note 17, at 730. 
 152 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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beneficial to the system as a whole, and in some cases, 
popularity could be seen as a sign of an unfair advantage. 
However, before coming to a conclusion, we must first analyze 
the effect the eBay decision has on the state of injunctive relief 
in federal courts, as well as the social and economic effects of 
injunctive relief on the patent system, the economy, and 
technological development as a whole.  
Prior to the eBay case, the Federal Circuit had granted 
injunctive relief for infringement of a patent almost as a matter 
of course.153 However, in eBay, the Supreme Court overturned a 
long line of federal cases following this general propensity to 
award an injunction.154 Justice Thomas, in the majority opinion, 
laid out a four-factor test that must be satisfied in order to 
justify the granting of injunctive relief: 
A plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable 
injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as monetary 
damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, 
considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and 
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public 
interest would not be disserved buy a permanent injunction.155 
The majority held that the issuance of permanent injunctions 
would be decided on a case-by-case basis upon consideration of 
these factors in order to maintain the “well-established 
principles of equity.”156 A survey of the district courts’ 
interpretation of the decision, however, yielded a consensus 
that the majority of courts are applying Justice Kennedy’s 
approach laid out in his concurring opinion, in which a three-
tiered categorization of patent holders’ rights is defined.157 
These categories separate patent holders into patentees that 
participate in the manufacture and sales of patented products 
and methods, research and nonprofit institutions that produce 
patentable inventions, and inventors that pursue 
commercialization of the patented inventions by licensing.158 
  
 153 Dariush Keyhani, Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases, 6 BUFF. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 1, 3-4 (2008); see also W.L. Gore & Assoc. v. Garlock, Inc., 842 F.2d 1275, 
1281 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[A]n injunction should issue once infringement has been 
established unless there is sufficient reason for denying it.”). 
 154 See eBay, 547 U.S. at 394. 
 155 Id. at 391. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Keyhani, supra note 153, at 2; see also Bernard H. Chao, After eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange: The Changing Landscape for Patent Remedies, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 543 (2008). 
 158 eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97. 
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When categorized, the district courts more liberally granted 
injunctive relief to the first two groups and failed to award 
injunctive relief in almost all cases involving this third group.159 
This denial of injunctive relief is inherently inequitable to 
those parties who choose to take advantage of their procured 
patent rights in certain ways, and some critics argue it is a 
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.160  
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states 
that “private property [shall not] be taken for public use, 
without just compensation.”161 Advocates in support of 
injunctive relief argue that denying this remedy where a patent 
is found to be infringed is inconsistent with the patent holder’s 
right to due process of law and thus violates this clause.162 The 
idea is that the government essentially grants the patent 
holder an exclusive property right when the patent is issued, 
and although this right is an intellectual-property right, it 
should be treated no differently from rights assigned to 
personal or real property.163 When the courts find that this 
property right has been violated, in this case when the patent 
has been infringed, this property right must be recognized, and 
the patent owner is deserving of absolute injunctive relief. The 
government’s imposition of unexpected limitations on this 
right, as in the case of allowing further future infringement, is 
in essence a “de facto private eminent domain sanctioned by 
the government.”164 
In addition to conflicts with the U.S. Constitution, 
failure to reward injunctive relief may run astray of 
commitments to international intellectual-property agreements 
as well. These agreements include the Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement under 
GATT.165 TRIPS was signed and put into effect in the mid-
1990s, committing the United States, as well as all other 
signatories, to its multitude of requirements. One of the 
  
 159 Keyhani, supra note 153, at 2. In 2008, Keyhani researched cases involving 
this third group—inventors who pursue commercialization of the patented inventions 
by licensing—in an analysis of the effects of the eBay decision.  
 160 Id. at 4. 
 161 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 162 Keyhani, supra note 153, at 4 (citing Paul M. Schoenhard, Who Took My 
IP—Defending the Availability of Injunctive Relief of Patent Owners, 16 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 187, 193 (2008)).  
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. at 5-6. 
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limitations outlined in Article 30 states, “Members may provide 
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with 
a normal exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking 
account of the legitimate interests of third parties.”166 The 
denial of an injunction to a patent holder whose patent was 
found to be infringed is a denial of the right to exclude and is a 
forced compulsory license.167 The right to exclude and the right 
to choose how one wishes to commercialize one’ patent is part 
of the normal exploitation of a patent.168 Forcing the patent 
holder to license the rights to an infringing party prejudices the 
legitimate interest of the patent holder, and critics argue this 
requirement violates the United States’ obligation under the 
TRIPS agreement.169 
Finally, and most importantly, limiting the award of 
injunctive relief is bad economic policy. Injunctive relief 
strengthens the patent system, and reinforces the incentives to 
invent and have these inventions patented. When injunctive 
relief is no longer awarded, or is awarded in a more limited 
fashion, it has the effect of undermining both innovation and 
entrepreneurship. With the expansive globalization in the past 
decades that has opened up vast numbers of lower-cost 
markets, what we once were able to manufacture and sell in 
the United States can no longer be manufactured here, at least 
not competitively. One of the last frontiers in which the United 
States and other highly developed countries thrive is 
innovation and technology. With the weakening of intellectual-
property rights the lack of a per se right to an injunction, we 
are effectively weakening the United States’ last economic edge 
in the global marketplace.170 With the current standard for 
injunctive relief, patent holders are being unjustly treated. The 
only solution available is congressional action to amend the 
Patent Act to undo the harm created by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in eBay and to allow for a per se right to injunctive 
relief. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The ITC’s section 337 proceedings involving patent 
disputes must be abolished. The large number of 
inconsistencies between patent suits before the ITC and those 
in federal court has created a variety of problems that must be 
remedied before the divergent path of patent law in the United 
States can be righted. These issues include the trending of ITC 
cases away from the venue’s initial purpose of offering 
protection against foreign industries171 and concerns with 
respect to compliance with international law.172 Furthermore, 
studies show that proceedings before the ITC improperly favor 
patent holders,173 promote inefficiencies in the patent system,174 
and lead to judicial waste.175  
Some aspects of section 337 proceedings have been 
shown to be quite advantageous, however, and amendments 
should be made to the patent system currently in place to take 
advantage of the lessons learned. These amendments include 
the granting of in rem jurisdiction to the federal courts when 
addressing cases involving importation of allegedly infringing 
products and a congressional action to amend the Patent Act to 
allow for a per se right to an injunction. In addition, Congress 
should adopt the proposed Patent Pilot Program, which would 
create a more specialized district-court system in which to hear 
patent cases176 and offer a united base upon which further 
amendments can be more easily implemented. 
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